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University of Pittsburgh
K. Bryan Menk
Duquesne University

Captive finance firms play an important role as financial intermediaries. Yet, they receive little attention
in financial research. Recently, finance companies have grown by engaging in acquisition activities.
Given their unique characteristics, finance companies may be more capable of extracting gains from
acquisitions than other firms. We explain their advantages, and assess the market response and long-term
valuation of finance companies that engage in acquisitions. Our results indicate that acquisitions by
captive finance firms are wealth enhancing in the short term and the long term. However, the market
reacts negatively when flexible captive financing firms acquire highly regulated depository institutions.
INTRODUCTION
Captive finance companies compete with depository financial institutions in the market for loans. The
unique characteristics of captive firms affect their ability to compete in the loan market. Since captive
finance companies cannot offer insured checkable or savings deposits, they are forced to obtain funding in
other ways, which are more expensive than deposits. This may restrict them from channeling their funds
to the most credit worthy borrowers, because the spread over their cost may be too narrow.
On the favorable side, finance companies are not subject to the regulations that are imposed on
depository institutions. Therefore, they avoid explicit and implicit costs associated with complying with
FDIC regulations. This advantage may be especially acute when they attempt to expand, because they
have more flexibility to grow the business without being required to boost capital. Conversely, depository
institutions are more restricted because of their capital requirements, and must maintain higher capital
levels as they grow. Depository institutions are less able to leverage their growth, because they normally
raise their capital proportionately in line with their growth in assets. Furthermore, depository institutions
may be forced to increase their capital requirement percentage if their new assets are viewed as more
risky than their existing assets. In addition, finance companies are more capable of leveraging their
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growth to achieve a higher return on equity, which may translate into higher valuations. Thus, finance
companies may be rivals to depository institutions for acquisition targets.
Our objective is to estimate valuation effects of acquisitions by finance companies, and also to assess
their performance following acquisitions. We find a favorable stock price response to acquisitions by
captive finance companies. In addition, parent companies whose captive finance subsidiaries participate
in an acquisition experience positive and significant long run returns. The long run returns are more
favorable following the acquisition of targets that are not subject to bank regulations.
Background
Captive finance companies are linked with many types of firms, including automobile, financial, and
retail companies. They were originally intended to function as the lending arm of their parent companies,
and focused on equipment financing or personal loans. In recent years, they have begun to take active
roles in the capital markets. Their business focus has branched out from customer financing to
commercial real estate, business loan portfolios, and finance receivables. The captive finance company
segment is one of the fastest growing in today’s financial markets. As captive finance companies continue
to grow, they become more attractive to targets as potential acquirers or partners. For example, in 2002,
Newbridge Capital acquired Shenzhen Development Bank of China. There was concern by Shenzhen that
being acquired by a commercial bank would create a situation where they would be considered an
extension of existing operations or just another branch. They actively sought to sell to a non-banking
institution thereby avoiding this situation (WorldSources, Inc., 2002).
Captive finance companies have increasingly employed an acquisition strategy to increase their
market penetration and scope. For instance, in the case of Textron Financial Corporation, a subsidiary of
Textron Inc., the captive firm acquired approximately $400 million in assets from STI Credit Corporation,
a subsidiary of SunTrust Credit. Stephen A. Giliotti, chairman, president and CEO of Textron Financial
made the following remarks:
"This strategic acquisition gives us an excellent opportunity to diversify and leverage our
existing small business group products using SunTrust Credit's proven origination and
service platform. This will allow us to expand our market reach, gain new customers
more cost effectively, and achieve 10 to 15 percent growth per year in this business
(Business Wire, 2001)."
Finance companies are similar to commercial banks and savings institutions in that they serve the
market for loans, equipment leasing, and credit card financing. However, finance companies tend to focus
on consumer or small business finance and equipment leasing, while commercial banks traditionally focus
on business loans and services, and savings institutions focus on mortgages. As a wholly owned
subsidiary of their parent company, the captive finance company can utilize the full backing and financial
power of their parent (Remolana and Wulfekuhler, 1992). As a subsidiary of a larger company, the
management of a captive finance company is under scrutiny by upper management as well as board
members; they experience evaluation of their operations to a greater degree (Subrahmanyam, Ranjan and
Rosenstein, 1997). This may constrain their merger and acquisition activity to those that truly maximize
shareholder value, rather then growth for its own sake. Captive finance companies have special
knowledge of their particular industry when determining the value of a target (Haynes, 1996). They seek
targets that will allow them to capitalize on their best business practices leading to profitable expansion.
In addition, there are important regulatory differences between finance companies and depository
institutions. While depository institutions can rely on relatively low-cost deposits, finance companies
must rely on the issuance of securities, such as commercial paper (Remolana and Wulfekuhler, 1992).
This regulatory difference places finance companies at a disadvantage. However, this difference also
means that finance companies are not subject to the scrutiny that depository institutions must face as a
result of using federally insured depositor funds. Finance companies are subject to oversight by state
agencies, but there are no national regulations governing acquisitions by finance companies (Carey, Post,
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and Sharpe, 1998). Conversely, depository institutions such as banks and savings institutions are subject
to more stringent national regulations when pursuing an acquisition. Bank regulators such as the FDIC
must consider the needs of the community (Berger, Demsetz, and Stichan, 1999). Second, the FDIC
cannot approve a bank acquisition that will lessen competition; hence, the application process requires
that a potential bank acquirer show evidence that competition will not be reduced (Berger, Demsetz, and
Stichan, 1999). Third, depository institutions are subject to capital requirements, and must ensure that
they will satisfy capital guidelines when completing an acquisition (Berger, Demsetz, and Stichan, 1999).
The capital adequacy guidelines are also important because they can affect the market’s perception of an
acquisition. Even if a depository institution satisfies national regulations regarding its capital adequacy, it
may be subject to market concerns that it will have to raise capital in the future to support the integration
of the merged companies. The market may penalize an acquirer that will likely need to raise more capital
after an acquisition, because its return on equity may be reduced as a result. Unlike depository
institutions, captive finance companies can pursue acquisitions without being required to meet specific
capital requirements. Thus, finance companies have more financial flexibility when pursuing acquisitions.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Research on Captive Finance Companies
Research on finance companies has been limited. Studies, such as Remolona and Wulfekuhler (1992)
have focused on the characteristics of captive finance firms and finance companies. Others, such as
Carey, Post, and Sharpe (1998) and Barron, Chong, and Staten (2004) investigate the lending
characteristics of captive finance firms. Roberts and Viscione (1981) find that captive firms permit the
parent company to take on more debt. Bodnaruk, O’Brien and Simonov (2016) show that parent firms
achieve greater market share and profitability by establishing a captive finance subsidiary, although
approximately four years is required for benefits to be achieved.
The literature indicates that captive finance subsidiaries improve efficiency within an organization by
restructuring the method in which financing functions are handled. They improve upon the internal
monitoring and vetting of borrowers, and this facilitates their lending practices. While they sometimes
target the market for relatively high-risk borrowers they also compete with other lending institutions in
markets for all forms of borrowers (Haynes, 1996).
Research on Bank Acquisitions
The closest research related to acquisitions by finance companies is the large set of studies on
acquisitions by commercial banks. Due to deregulation in the banking industry, there has been a surge in
the merger and acquisition activity in the bank sector. The approval of interstate banking and the removal
of restrictions on in-state branching have resulted in numerous acquisitions by banks and bank holding
companies (see Jayaratne and Strahan, (1998) and Calem (1994)). The allowance, by the Federal Reserve,
for banks to participate in underwriting activities through “Section 20” affiliates resulted in many banking
mergers and acquisitions (see Saunders (1999)). The motives behind banking acquisitions have been
examined in several studies. Some evidence exists that the mergers and acquisitions are an attempt to
become “too big to fail”, and increase access to the Federal Reserve safety net has been documented by
Saunders and Wilson (1999). Traditionally only banks or bank holding companies were able to acquire
banking targets.
There is evidence that banking acquirers overpay for targets when the interest of management are not
properly aligned with those of the firm (Subrahmanyam, Rangan and Rosenstein, 1997). In general,
research suggests that commercial banks experienced negative or neutral valuation effects in response to
acquisition announcements and weak performance following their acquisitions. However, the results from
these studies cannot be used to make inferences about finance company acquisitions, because the
structure and operations of finance companies differ from that of a typical commercial bank.
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HYPOTHESES
Hypothesis Regarding Impact on Wealth
When captive finance companies acquire non-financial businesses, they can offer financing to the
customer base of the target. Thus, they not only generate business, but can enhance the cash flows of a
business that they acquire by offering financing to target customers. Captive finance firms may add
expertise due to their niche knowledge (Haynes, 1996), and may use this knowledge in the target selection
and negotiation of the acquisition. Consequently, we hypothesize that acquisition announcements by
finance companies will elicit a favorable market response.
Hypothesis 1: Captive finance acquisitions will have positive abnormal returns.
Hypothesis Regarding Impact of Acquiring Banking Targets
A significant portion of captive finance company acquisitions has been focused on depository
institutions. When captive finance companies pursue depository institutions, they enter a more regulated
environment (Berger, Demsetz, and Strahan, 1999) and cannot capitalize on regulatory arbitrage.
Furthermore, the costs of regulatory compliance may be especially high for a parent company that does
not have experience with such compliance. Therefore, finance companies are expected to experience less
favorable valuation effects when acquiring depository institutions.
Hypothesis 2: Captive finance acquisitions will have lower abnormal returns if the target
firm is a depository institution.
DATA
The sample of captive finance acquisitions was taken from the Securities Data Corporation (SDC)
mergers and acquisitions database. The mergers and acquisitions included ranged from 1980 through
2003. The captive finance firms included are subsidiaries of parent companies listed on the New York
Stock Exchange, American Stock Exchange, or NASDAQ. The original dataset was reduced from 1019 to
525 after excluding stock repurchases, self-tender offers, withdrawn offers and firms whose return data
was unavailable from CRSP.
Table 1 shows the distribution of captive finance acquisitions by year and SIC code. There is an
obvious acceleration in acquisition between 1997 and 2000. This period coincides with a booming
economy and the ultimate passage of the Financial Modernization Act. The majority of captive finance
companies fall into the 9000 SIC code. The second most prevalent SIC codes are the 6000’s representing
financial services companies.
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TABLE 1
ANNOUNCEMENTS OF ACQUISITIONSAB
Panel A by Year
Year of
Number of
Percent of Total
Announcement
Announcements
1980
1
1981
3
1982
4
1983
8
1984
2
1985
11
1986
11
1987
13
1988
14
1989
17
1990
19
1991
12
1992
13
1993
23
1994
20
1995
29
1996
32
1997
71
1998
69
1999
49
2000
25
2001
29
2002
28
2003
22
525
Total
Announcements
A
This panel provides the distribution of announcements by year of acquisition.

0.19%
0.57%
0.76%
1.52%
0.38%
2.10%
2.10%
2.48%
2.67%
3.24%
3.62%
2.29%
2.48%
4.38%
3.81%
5.52%
6.10%
13.52%
13.14%
9.33%
4.76%
5.52%
5.33%
4.19%
100%

Panel B by SIC Code
SIC Code

Number of Announcements

Percent of Total

1000-1999
1
0.19%
2000-2999
2
0.38%
3000-3999
48
9.14%
4000-4999
18
3.43%
5000-5999
6
1.14%
6000-6999
214
40.76%
7000-7999
11
2.10%
9000-9999
225
42.86%
Total
525
100%
Announcements
B
This panel provides the distribution of announcements by SIC code of Target’s Primary SIC
code.
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Descriptive statistics of the operational factors of the acquiring companies are documented in Table 2.
The results show that acquirers are large companies that are highly profitable. The mean (median) value
of Total Assets is $201 billion ($192 billion), with an ROE of 17.89% (20.30%.) The firms hold a mean
(median) leverage value of 41.38% (47.70%.)
TABLE 2
FIRM CHARACTERISTICS
This table documents the mean and median values for the acquiring firm in the year
prior to the acquisition.
Variable

Mean
(Median)
201,321.27
Assets ($millions)
(192,876.00)
118,782.40
Market Value ($millions)
(66,105.34)
2.37
ROA
(2.61)
17.89
ROE
(20.30)
41.38
Debt to Total Assets
(47.70)
0.05
Cash and Cash Equivalents to
(0.03)
Total Assets

METHODOLOGY
Estimating the Impact on Wealth
Event study methodology was used to test the impact of the acquisition announcement on the returns
of the acquirer. The event day, designated as day 0, is the original announcement day of the acquisition.
Standard event study methodology is used to measure the average abnormal stock returns on the t-days
surrounding the event, the ordinary least squares market model is used. A 110-day estimation period was
chosen to reflect normal returns in a period where an acquisition did not occur. Abnormal returns for the
(0,+1), (-1, +1), (0, 0) and (-1,0) windows are estimated and examined. The CRSP equally weighted index
is used as the market proxy; the study was done using Eventus (Cowan, 1999).
Estimating the Impact on Wealth in the Long-Run
The impact of the acquisition announcement on long-run returns of the acquirer is measured using
traditional event study methodology and a buy and hold strategy. The long run abnormal returns are
calculated for the six month, one year, eighteen month, two and three year periods.
RT = Π [ 1+ Rit /nt] -1

(1)

Where RT is the return over the event period of six, twelve, eighteen months etc. Rit is the return on
stock I in month t and nt is the number of companies that are included in each month (Lyon, Barber, and
Tsai, 1999). To evaluate the significance of long-run returns, two control samples were constructed. The
first was matched on ultimate parent SIC code, where the matched sample did not participate in an
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acquisition over the same time period. The second consists of large banks that may have been affected by
the captive finance acquisitions over the same time period.
Cross-Sectional Regressions to Determine Characteristics that Effect Wealth
To explain the variation in wealth effects surrounding the announcement, cross-sectional regression
models are used. The cross-sectional models include the hypothesized variables, along with the following
control variables. The cross-sectional model is specified as:
CAR = β0 + β 1LNMVL + β 2CASH + β 3DEBT + β 4BANK + β 5PRE-1999 + β 6EBITDA +
β 7DIVERSE + εI

(2)

Where CAR is the cumulative abnormal return over 1 day window, (0,0), LNMVL is the log of
market value of acquirer, CASH is cash and cash equivalents divided by total assets of the firm, DEBT is
the ratio of total debt to total assets, BANK is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is a banking target,
PRE-1999 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the acquisition occurred prior to passage of the GrammLeach-Bliley Act in 1999 (US Senate Committee, 1999), EBITDA is earnings before interest, taxes,
depreciation and amortization scaled by total assets, and DIVERSE is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the
observation represents an acquisition in another SIC code.
Cross-Sectional Analysis of Long-Run Returns
To explain the variation in wealth effects in the long-run event windows, buy-and-hold returns for 12
months are modeled to be a function of the same variables that are used to explain variation in valuation
effects among acquisitions. The cross-sectional model is specified as:
BHAR = β 0 + β 1LNMVL + β 2CASH + β 3DEBT + β 4BANK + β 5PRE-1999 + β 6EBITDA +
β 7DIVERSE + εi

(3)

Where BHAR is the buy and hold abnormal return over the 12 month window, and the remaining
variables were defined previously.
RESULTS
Impact on Wealth
The effect of the acquisition on the value of the companies in the sample and sub-samples is
documented in Table 3.
The cumulative abnormal return for the (0,0) event window is 0.37%, representing a gain of $44
million for firms with the average market capitalization of $119 billion. Overall, the captive finance
subsidiaries that participated in an acquisition earned significant positive abnormal returns in the event
windows surrounding the announcements. The number of positive returns were significantly larger then
the number of negative returns at the 5% level. These results support Hypothesis 1 that the acquisition
announcement will create significant positive abnormal returns for the captive finance acquirer.
These results support the reasoning that captive finance subsidiaries have access to low cost capital
through their parent companies and operate under strict corporate control. The access to available funds
allows them to participate in a greater number of acquisitions and the strict corporate control results in a
better valuation of the target. There are some differences in the wealth effects on the parent in the event
windows; this could indicate a distinction in perception by the market of the targets that are acquired.
Next, we explore variation in the abnormal return.
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TABLE 3
CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURNS
This table provides the mean, median and t-statistics for the cumulative abnormal returns.
Sample Type
Total sample

No.
524

Bank Target

54

Non-Bank Target

470

Same 3 Digit SIC
Code Target

57

Different 3 Digit
SIC Code Target

467

(0,+1)
0.44
(0.11)
1.829*
-0.42
(-0.47)
-1.272
0.57
(0.16)
2.375**
0.10
(0.31)
0.700
0.51
(0.11)
1.845*

CAR EVENT WINDOW
(-1, +1)
(0, 0)
0.38
0.37
(-0.06)
(0.05)
0.588
2.066**
-0.48
-0.47
(-0.22)
(-0.31)
-1.642
-2.077**
0.53
0.48
(-0.02)
(0.09)
1.192
2.874***
0.12
0.07
(-0.09)
(0.26)
-0.239
0.317
0.46
0.42
(-0.04)
(0.04)
0.828
2.178**

(-1,0)
0.31
(-0.09)
0.339
-0.52
(-0.27)
-2.051**
0.44
(-0.05)
1.130
0.09
(-0.06)
-0.553
0.37
(-0.10)
0.691

+/271/253
(1.983)**
23/31
(0.687)
249/221
(2.376)**
31/26
(0.981)
241/226
(1.807)*

The symbols *,**,***, and **** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels,
respectively, using a 2-tail test.

Impact on Wealth by Sub-Sample: Bank vs. Non-Bank
The majority of targets acquired by captive finance subsidiaries are non-bank targets. When the
sample is divided into bank vs. non-bank target, the results show that captive finance subsidiaries that
acquired banking targets experience significant negative abnormal returns at the 5% level. For the (0,0)
one-day event window mean cumulative abnormal returns were a significant negative abnormal return of
0.47%. This result is consistent with previous research on bank acquisitions, which find negative or
insignificant abnormal returns. Conversely, when the captive finance subsidiaries acquired non-banking
targets, they experienced significant positive abnormal returns at the 10% level. In the (0,0) one-day event
window the return achieved was a significant positive abnormal return of 0.48%.
These results support Hypothesis 2, which states that the acquisition of a banking target will create
significant negative abnormal returns. What the results show is that, although captive finance companies
are a hybrid of a bank and non-bank company that competes well with banks on some levels, they do not
perform well when acquiring banking assets. This may be attributable to the higher degree of complexity
or the regulatory constraints in the banking industry.
Impact on Wealth by Sub-Sample: Same vs. Different Industry
To examine the effect of industry diversification, the sample was divided into targets in the same
versus different SIC codes than the acquirer. The majority of targets acquired by captive finance
subsidiaries were in a different SIC code. The results show that the parent companies whose captive
finance subsidiaries acquired targets that created industrial diversification experienced significant positive
abnormal returns at the 5% level. In the (0,0) one-day event window the return achieved was a significant
positive abnormal return of 0.42%. The sub-sample of targets in the same SIC code was positive but
insignificant.
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Impact on Long-Run Wealth
The effect of the acquisition on the long-run value of the companies in the sample is documented in
Table 4.
TABLE 4
LONG-RUN ABNORMAL RETURNS
This table provides the mean, t-test statistics (one sample and paired sample), and p-values
for the long-run abnormal returns.
Sample Type
Total sample
SIC Matched
Control Sample
Bank Control
Sample
Total Sample vs.
SIC Code Match
Sample
Total Sample vs.
Bank Match
Sample

LONG-RUN RETURNS EVENT WINDOW
No.
(1,6)
(1,12)
(1, 18)
489
0.080
0.181
0.250
12.335
12.798
14.728
0.000****
0.000**** 0.000****
489
-0.006
-0.041
-0.030
-0.294
-0.994
-0.663
0.769
0.321
0.508
489
-0.004
0.010
-0.011
-0.304
0.602
-0.496
0.761
0.547
0.620
489
0.083
0.223
0.323
4.393
5.685
6.627
0.000****
0.000**** 0.000****
489
0.086
0.176
0.263
9.276
12.955
14.748
0.000****
0.000**** 0.000****

(1,24)
0.372
15.948
0.000****
0.049
1.132
0.258
0.047
1.679
0. 090*
0.286
8.720
0.000****
0.327
14.888
0.000****

(1,36)
0.559
8.072
0.000****
0.014
0.223
0.824
0.053
1.394
0.164
0.532
9.923
0.000****
0.518
17.572
0.000****

The symbols *,**,***, and **** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels, respectively,
using a 2-tail test.

The results show significant positive abnormal returns for the parents of the captive finance
subsidiaries in a long-run time period. The returns are significant at the 0.01% level. The acquisitions
created a mean return of 0.372% over the two-year time period with similar results overall. Two matched
samples were created with which to compare these results. The first consisted of firms in the same SIC
code as the acquirer parent, and the second consisted of banks chosen on the basis of comparable size to
the captive finance unit. Neither the SIC matched sample nor the Banking matched sample experienced
acquisitions by captive finance subsidiaries over the event periods. While the SIC matched sample
showed insignificant abnormal returns overall, the Banking matched sample, which experienced small
positive returns at the 10% level of significance in the two-year time period.
The results of the captive finance sample and the control samples were compared to determine if they
differed significantly from each other. The captive finance long run returns were significantly different
from both the SIC and Banking matched samples in all time periods at the 0.01% level of significance.
These results may be credited to the high level of corporate control that captive finance subsidiaries
experience. The environment they operate under prevents them from taking part in acquisitions that are
motivated by “empire building” or the “hubris hypothesis.”
Cross-Sectional Analysis of Cumulative Abnormal Return
The results of the multivariate regression on the CARs are displayed in Table 5.
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TABLE 5
CROSS-SECTIONAL REGRESSIONS ON (0,0) CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURNS
This table provides the results of multivariate regression where CAR, Cumulative abnormal return over 1
day window, (0,0), is the dependent variable. LNMVL = log of market value of acquirer; CASH = ratio of
cash and cash equivalents to total assets; DEBT = ratio of debt to total assets; BANK = dummy variable
equal to 1 if the target is a bank; DIVERSE = dummy variable equal to 1 if the target from another SIC
code; PRE-1999 = dummy variable equal to 1 if the acquisition occurred prior to 1999; EBITDA =
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization.

CONSTANT
LNMVL
CASH
DEBT
BANK

Model 1
0.050
(3.647)****
-0.291
(3.975)****
0.190
(3.007)***
0.009
(0.136)
-0.214
(-3.345)***

Model 2
0.409
(3.372)***
-0.312
(-4.164)****
0.167
(2.442)**
-0.041
(-0.547)
-0.238
(-3.665)****

Model 4
0.028
(1.787)*
-0.258
(-3.431)***
0.184
(2.640)***
-0.002
(-0.023)

-0.156
(-2.146)**
0.129
(1.672)*

Model 3
0.044
(2.775)***
-0.309
(-4.103)****
0.170
(2.485)**
-0.037
(-0.498)
-0.221
(-3.265)***
0.055
(0.837)
-0.159
(-2.180)**
0.127
(1.644)

-0.151
(-2.109)**

12.70%
7.498****
226

15.70%
7.635****
215

15.60%
6.635***
215

11.70%
5.698****
215

DIVERSE
PRE-1999
EBITDA
Adj Rsq
F-statistic
N

0.117
(1.816)*
-0.164
(-2.198)**
0.110
(1.403)

The symbols *,**,***, and **** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% and 0.1%
levels, respectively, using a 2-tail test.

Several models were used to explain the variation in CARs for the captive finance acquisition sample.
For all models, the log of market values is negative and significant at the 1% level. The level of liquidity
as measured by the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total assets is positive and significant in each of
the four models. This variable is significant at the 5% level or higher; indicating that access to cash
increases the positive returns to the acquirer. This is one of the advantages of captive finance subsidiaries
discussed earlier. Access to low cost capital through the parent company is a decided advantage. The
BANK dummy representing a banking target is included in three of the four models, and it is negative and
significant at the 1% level in all three. This is in support of Hypothesis 2 and coincides with the subsample univariate results, which indicate that captive finance companies are not able to integrate banking
assets successfully. The DIVERSE dummy, representing acquisitions of targets from another industry is
insignificant and positive in the presence of the BANK dummy, but significant and positive at the 10%
level with the removal of the BANK dummy. These results would seem to support Hypothesis 2, which
says that acquiring a banking target creates poor results for the captive finance subsidiary. A variable
representing profitability, EBITDA, is positive in the models when it is included.
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Cross-Sectional Regression: Long-Run Abnormal Returns
The results of the multivariate regression on the long-run abnormal returns are displayed in Table 6.
TABLE 6
CROSS-SECTIONAL REGRESSIONS ON (1,12) LONG-RUN ABNORMAL RETURNS
This table provides the results of multivariate regression where C112, Long-run abnormal return over 1
year window, (1,12), is the dependent variable. LNMVL = log of market value of acquirer; CASH = ratio
of cash and cash equivalents to total assets; DEBT = ratio of debt to total assets; BANK = dummy
variable equal to 1 if the target is a bank; DIVERSE = dummy variable equal to 1 if the target from
another SIC code; PRE-1999 = dummy variable equal to 1 if the acquisition occurred prior to 1999;
EBITDA = earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization.
Model 1
CONSTANT
LNMVL
CASH
DEBT
BANK
DIVERSE
PRE-1999
EBITDA
Adjusted R-squared
F-statistic
N

-0.492
(-5.217)****
0.342
(7.036)****
-0.135
(-2.889)***
-0.095
(-2.106)**
0.038
(0.935)
0.491
(10.816)****
0.070
(1.474)
24.70%
26.12****
461

Model 2
-0.474
(-5.197)***
0.352
(6.995)****
-0.135
(-2.893)***
-0.089
(-1.976)**
0.025
(0.587)
0.493
(10.864)****
0.165
(1.365)
24.60%
26.003****
461

The symbols *,**,***, and **** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%,
1% and 0.1% levels, respectively, using a 2-tail test.

For all models, the log of market value is positive and significant at the 1% level or higher. This
coincides with the previous results, which indicate that a larger size is an advantage for the acquirer. The
level of liquidity as measured by the ratio of cash and equivalents to total assets is negative and
significant in each of the models. This variable is significant at the 1% level or higher; contrary to earlier
results liquidity has a negative impact on the long run returns to the acquirer. This could be a penalty for
having excess cash available on the parent company level that could be abused by management. The debt
to total asset ratio is negative and significant at the 5% level. The obligations when a firm holds debt may
be the cause of the negative relationship between debt and long-run returns. The other variables are not
significant.
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CONCLUSION
Our objective is to shed light on the performance of captive finance companies in response to their
acquisitions. We find that finance companies experience positive and significant abnormal returns upon
announcement and post-acquisition. We explain these results with the particular circumstances of the
captive finance subsidiary. The subsidiary is accountable to their parent company for the actions that they
take and have access to funding through their parent company. The accountability helps to ensure that the
acquisitions are value adding. Access to funding lowers the cost of acquiring a target, which benefits the
acquirer. This is supported by the cross-sectional analysis showing that the liquidity variable was positive
and significant. Finally we see that the market response at the time of the announcement is positive when
finance companies acquire non-banking targets. These results indicate that while captive finance
companies can succeed in creating positive returns through acquisitions they are negatively impacted
when acquiring assets that fall under the strict regulations of the banking industry. This paper was
motivated by the unique characteristics of captive finance firms and the benefits they receive from
operating without the compliance requirements and regulations of the banking industry. The results of this
paper support the decision of firms to establish captive finance subsidiaries.
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